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  We investigate price-based mechanisms with connectedness in combinatorial 
auctions, where with restrictions of privacy and complexity, the auctioneer asks a 
limited number of prices to buyers who provide demand responses. Consistent with the 
price-based property, several necessary and sufficient conditions are presented for the 
existence of the VCG mechanism, strategy-proofness with participation constraints, 
approximate strategy-proofness, Nash equilibrium, efficiency, core, and others. In all 
cases, the concept of the representative valuation function, which assigns the minimal 
valuation in both absolute and relative terms to any revealed package, plays the central 
role in determining whether these conditions are satisfied. 
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  This paper investigates the problem of combinatorial auction design, where 
multiple indivisible items with multiple units are sold to multiple buyers who have 
private and quasi-linear valuations. On the basis of the information about the buyers’ 
valuation functions that is collected through an auction, the auctioneer divides these 
items and units into multiple packages to be purchased by the respective buyers. 
Consistent with the buyers’ incentive, the possibility for achieving efficiency for 
suitable allocations of packages is examined when there is a limit to the range within 
which the auctioneer can collect such information. We introduce a new concept—the 
representative valuation function. This concept plays the central role in demonstrating 
simple and tractable methods for examining the possibility of achieving efficiency. 
  The revelation principle addressed by Myerson (1979) implies that under a 
condition about the buyer’s incentive, any well-behaved indirect mechanism can be 
replaced with a direct mechanism that requires each buyer to announce his/her entire 
valuation function truthfully. This principle plays the central role in rendering the study 
of incentives tractable; it is without loss of generality that researchers can confine their 
attention to direct mechanisms that are strategy-proof in the sense that each buyer 
regards making truthful announcements as the dominant strategy. Many researchers 
focused on a specific direct mechanism called the VCG (Vickery-Clarke-Groves) 
mechanism
1; it is the only mechanism that is efficient, strategy-proof, and ex-post 
individually rational in the sense that the resulting payoffs in the ex-post term for the 
seller and the buyers are non-negative at all times. 
  A real buyer, however, is afraid that any information that is confidential and is not 
necessary for the auctioneer’s decisions, such as the absolute valuations on desired 
packages, could leak to his/her rivals. Moreover, it might be too complicated for any 
buyer who has normal limitations on his/her cognitive ability to assess valuations on all 
possible packages simultaneously. The revelation principle, however, does not address 
concerns over issues such as privacy and complexity mentioned above, even if there 
exists a possibility that the auctioneer’s decisions are substantially limited by the 
                                                 
1  See Vickery (1961), Clarke (1971), and Groves (1973). 4 
 
concerns. Hence, in the field of auction theory, it is meaningful to reexamine various 
types of indirect mechanisms and search for the possibility of replacing a direct 
mechanism with an alternative indirect auction format that can relax the constraints of 
privacy and complexity while maintaining the buyers’ incentive and transparency in 
decisions.
2 
  On the basis of this motivation, many researchers have investigated one class of 
auction formats, which can be called price-based mechanisms, where the auctioneer 
asks a limited number of price vectors and each buyer reveals packages as his/her 
demand responses to them. An example is the clock auction a la Walrasian tatonnement, 
in which the auctioneer starts with a low price vector and ascends slowly until there is 
no item for which the aggregate demand exceeds the supply. Several authors such as 
Kelso and Crawford (1982), Gul and Stacchetti (1999, 2000), and Milgrom (2000) have 
shown that when the buyers have substitutes preferences and behave as price takers, the 
auctioneer can identify the competitive equilibrium price vector and suggest it to the 
buyers through the procedure of the clock auction, thereby achieving efficiency. There 
are various modifications of the clock auction that should be studied, wherein the ask 
prices of the auctioneer might be non-linear and non-anonymous when the buyers have 
complements preferences.
3 
  The clock auction has a desirable property in terms of privacy and complexity; 
what the auctioneer needs to know for decisions is only partial information about the 
buyers’ valuation functions, which is collected from the observation of the buyers’ 
demand responses. Hence, the buyers do not have to assess valuations about all possible 
packages. This property can facilitate the buyers’ decision making. 
  Despite these merits, a naïve format of the clock auction has a serious limitation: 
the buyers do not have an incentive in behaving as price takers. Hence, the auctioneer 
generally fails to discover the correct competitive equilibrium, i.e., fails to achieve 
efficiency. Gul and Stacchetti (2000) have indicated that the clock auction and its 
                                                 
2  For related points of view about the VCG mechanisms and direct mechanisms in general, see, 
for instance, Rothkopf, Teisberg, and Kahn (1990), Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), and Parkes 
(2006). 
3 See Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), Milgrom (2004, Chapters 7 and 8), Ausubel (2004, 2006), 
Ausubel and Cramton (2004), Ausubel, Cramton, and Milgrom (2006), Parkes (2006), Mishra 
and Parkes (2007), and others. 5 
 
variants can never be strategy-proof as long as the determination of the buyers’ 
payments is dependent only on the information that is available in the process when the 
ask price vector of the auctioneer converges on that of the competitive equilibrium. 
  For the buyer’s incentive to be compatible with privacy and complexity, this paper 
examines a more general class of price-based mechanisms, in which the auctioneer does 
not necessarily attempt to discover the competitive equilibrium. This class of 
mechanism is needed for the buyer’s incentive to be compatible with privacy and 
complexity. The auctioneer instead infers the range of profiles of the buyers’ valuation 
functions that are consistent with the observed price-demand sets, i.e., the whole data 
about how the buyers provide their demand responses through the auction’s procedure. 
In this case, the allocation and payments that are induced by the mechanism must be the 
same across all possible profiles in this range. Since the range of such profiles is not 
generally single-valued, it is quite important to search for a simple and easy method to 
confirm whether the mechanism is implemented as being price-based, even if the scope 
in which he/she can collect information is limited beforehand. 
  This paper imposes a restriction on the class of price-based mechanisms, which can 
be called connectedness, meaning that the auctioneer is prohibited from making his/her 
ask price vector jump discontinuously to a price vector that he/she has not previously 
asked for. This restriction makes real buyers’ demand responses easier to provide, 
because they can refer to their previous demand responses. With connectedness, we 
demonstrate a necessary and sufficient condition under which there exists a price-based 
VCG mechanism in spite of the limited scope in which the auctioneer can collect 
information. In this case, we can also use a simple and easy method to confirm whether 
this condition is satisfied. 
  Without loss of generality, after observing the price-demand set for each buyer, the 
auctioneer can focus only on a particular valuation function named the representative 
valuation function. In the consistency with the observed price-demand set, the 
representative valuation function is defined as assigning the minimal valuation to any 
revealed package in both absolute and relative terms. The representative valuation 
function is easily calculated from the observed price-demand set. 
  We can show that the efficient allocation and the efficient allocations without any 
single buyer that are induced by the profile of representative valuation functions can 6 
 
also be induced by any profile of valuation functions that are consistent with the 
observed price-demand sets, if, and only if, these allocations are all revealed in these 
sets. Based on this property, our necessary and sufficient condition implies that the 
efficient allocation and the efficient allocations without any single buyer that are 
induced by the profile of representative valuation functions are revealed in the observed 
price-demand sets at all times. Therefore, the auctioneer can stop his/her price asking 
activity as soon as it is confirmed that these allocations are revealed. On these accounts, 
the auctioneer can keep a breach of privacy and complexity to a minimum. 
  The connectedness plays an important role for calculating the payments of the 
VCG mechanism; the auctioneer can calculate the relative valuation between any pair of 
packages as the summation of price differences, if and only if these packages are 
revealed. This property of connectedness, along with the revelation of the efficient 
allocation and the efficient allocations without any single buyer, guarantees that the 
auctioneer can calculate the payments of the VCG mechanism. 
  There is a difficulty in the implementation of the VCG mechanism as being 
price-based; the auctioneer has to make the buyers reveal all the efficient allocations 
without any single buyer as well as the overall efficient allocation. Gul and Stacchetti 
(2000) and Ausubel (2006) have indicated that it is impossible for the buyers to reveal 
the efficient allocations without any single buyer through any procedure of ascending 
auction that uses the single linear price trajectory to discover the competitive 
equilibrium. In order to implement the VCG mechanism as price-based, Ausubel (2006) 
designed an alternative, rather complicated, clock auction that uses multiple linear price 
trajectories that converge in not only the competitive equilibrium, but also the 
competitive equilibria without any single buyer, provided buyers have substitutes 
preferences. Parkes (2006) and Mishra and Parkes (2007) have investigated the 
primal-dual algorithm in the general environments with complements preferences to 
discover the more involved concept of universal competitive equilibrium, which reveals 
the efficient allocations without any single buyer and the efficient allocation all 
together.
4 
  Based on this difficulty for implementing the VCG mechanism as price-based, the 
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mentioned above enough. 7 
 
latter part of this paper replaces the constraint of ex-post individual rationality with 
weaker constraints named participation constraints, implying that the seller and the 
buyers have incentive to participate in the auction in the ex-ante and interim terms, 
respectively. With participation constraints, we examine the possibility of the existence 
of an efficient, strategy-proof, and price-based mechanism. 
We confine our attention to mechanisms in which the auctioneer always starts with 
a very low price vector, for which any buyer demands all items and units. We assume 
that the buyers’ valuation functions are randomly and independently determined. In this 
setting, we can show that there exists an efficient, strategy-proof, and price-based 
mechanism with participation constraints if and only if the efficient allocation that is 
induced by the profile of representative valuation functions is revealed in the observed 
price-demand sets at all times. In contrast to the VCG mechanisms, we do not need the 
efficient allocations without any single buyer to be revealed. Hence, the auctioneer can 
stop his/her price asking activity as soon as it is confirmed that the efficient allocation is 
revealed; the replacement of ex-post individual rationality with the participation 
constraints can dramatically decrease the privacy infringement and simplify the  
procedure of auction. 
We also investigate the situation in which the limitation of the range in which the 
auctioneer can collect information is too severe to achieve efficiency. We examine the 
possibility for an inefficient price-based mechanism to be strategy-proof in an 
approximate sense that there is a positive but small upper limit to each buyer’s possible 
gains from deviation. We require a mechanism to be strictly price-based in the sense that 
the allocation induced by this mechanism must be revealed at all times. We show a 
necessary and sufficient condition for a strictly price-based mechanism to be 
approximately strategy-proof. The concept of representative valuation function plays the 
central role; it is sufficient to examine only the buyers’ incentive when they have 
representative valuation functions. 
Finally, we investigate a general class of indirect mechanisms, and show 
characterization results for the consistency of the Nash equilibrium, efficiency, and core 
with the price-based property. Even in these cases, what we have to do for these results 
is to examine how the representative valuation functions. Based on these 
characterization results, we consider core-selecting mechanisms, which were addressed 8 
 
by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), Day and Raghavan (2007), and Day and Milgrom 
(2008). We show a characterization result for the existence of price-based Nash 
equilibria that induce core outcomes at all times; it is sufficient for this characterization 
that the efficient allocation is revealed in the price-demand sets whenever the buyers 
have representative valuation functions. 
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 models the problem of 
combinatorial auction design. Sections 3 and 4 introduce the concepts of price-demand 
set and price-based mechanism, respectively. Section 5 introduces the concept of 
representative valuation function, and shows the necessary and sufficient condition 
under which there exists the price-based VCG mechanism, where a simple and easy 
method is shown to confirm whether this condition is satisfied. Section 6 shows a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of efficient, strategy-proof, and 
price-based mechanisms. Section 7 indicates that even with participation constraints, the 
same condition as that in Section 6 is sufficient for the existence of such mechanisms. 
Section 8 considers mechanisms that are approximately strategy-proof. Section 9 
investigates indirect mechanisms in general, and shows characterization results for the 
compatibility of the Nash equilibrium, efficiency, and core with the price-based 
property. Section 10 investigates core-selecting mechanisms. Finally, Section 11 





  The present paper investigates the allocation problem in which there exist multiple 
items with multiple units that a single seller supplies to multiple buyers. Let us denote 
{1,..., } Nn   as the non-empty and finite set of buyers. A package for each buyer 
iN   is denoted by  1 ( ,..., ) ii i l aa a  , where a positive integer  z m  implies the amount 
of the  zt h   item that the seller supplies, and  {0,..., } iz z am   for each  {1,..., } zl   
implies the amount of the  zt h   item that buyer  i demands or obtains. The set of all 
packages for buyer i is denoted by 
{1,..., }{0,..., } iz zl A m
   . Let us denote by  i i aA   
the  null package for buyer i , where  0 iz a   for all  {1,..., } zl  . We define an 





   for  all  {1,..., } zl  . 
Let us denote by  i iN A A
    the set of all allocations. We define an allocation without a 
buyer  iN   as  \{ } ()
i






   for  all  {1,..., } zl  . 
Let us denote by 
i
j ji AA
   the set of all allocations without a buyer iN  . 
According to 
ii aA  , each buyer  \{} jNi   demands or obtains package  j a , 
whereas buyer  i  demands or obtains nothing. 
 A  valuation function for buyer  iN   is denoted by  : ii uA R  , which is 
quasi-linear, and satisfies that 
    ()0 i i ua  , 
and that any increase in the amount of items has a positive value, i.e., 
( 1 )      () () ii ii ua ua    whenever  ii aa    and  ii aa   . 
Let us denote by  i U   the set of all such valuation functions for buyer  i. Let  i iN UU
  , 
\{ }
i
j jN i UU
  , ( ) iiN uu U   , and  \{ } ()
ii
jj Ni uu U    . 
 An  allocation  aA   is said to be efficient for a profile uU    of valuation 10 
 
functions if 




    for  all aA   . 
Let us denote by 
*() Au A   the set of all efficient allocations for uU  . An 
allocation 
ii aA    without a buyer  i  is said to be efficient for a profile 
ii uU    of the 
valuation functions without buyer  iN    if 
   
\{ } \{ }
() () j ij i
jN i jN i
ua ua

    for  all 
ii aA   . 
Let us denote by 
*()
ii Au A    the set of all efficient allocations for 
ii uU  . 
  A direct mechanism, or shortly a mechanism, is defined as  ( ,( ) ) iiN Gg q   , where 
: gU A   implies the allocation function, and  : i qU R   implies the payment 
function for each buyer iN  . For every uU  , let us denote  ( ) ( ( )) ii N gu g u   , 
where ( ) ii gu A   for each iN  . We can interpret any mechanism as a naïve direct 
revelation where each buyer iN   is required to announce a valuation function 
ii uU    to the auctioneer, based on which the auctioneer selects the allocation 
() gu A    and transfers the monetary payment  ( ) i qu R    from each buyer i to the 
seller. In this case, the resulting payoff for each buyer  iN    is given by 
    ( ( ) )( ) ii i ugu qu   , 
where we assume that the true valuation function for buyer  i was given by  ii uU  . 
This is not necessarily the same as his/her announced function  i u  . The resulting 
revenue that the seller obtains is given by  ( ) i
iN
qu
   . 
 A  mechanism  G   is said to be efficient if for every  uU  ,  () gu A   is  efficient, 
i.e., 
* () () gu A u  . A mechanism  G  is said to be strategy-proof if for every  uU  , 
any buyer  iN   has incentive to truthfully reveal information about his/her valuation 
function  ii uU    as a dominant strategy, i.e., 
    (( ) ) ( ) ((,) ) (,)
ii
ii i iii ii ugu qu uguu quu     for  all  ii uU   . 
A mechanism  G   is said to be of the VCG type, if it is efficient, and for every  uU  , 11 
 
   
\{ } \{ }
() m a x ( ) ( () )
ii ij j j j
aAjN i jN i
qu ua u gu
 
  for  all iN  .
5 
It must be noted that any VCG mechanism  G  satisfies  ex-post individual rationality in 
the sense that the resulting revenue for the seller is always non-negative, i.e., 




   for  all uU  , 
and the resulting payoff for each buyer is always non-negative, i.e., 
(3)     ( ( )) ( ) 0 ii i ugu qu   for  all uU   and  all iN  . 
It is clear from the mechanism design literature that any VCG mechanism is 
strategy-proof, and that any efficient and strategy-proof mechanism G  that satisfies 
ex-post individual rationality must be VCG.
6 
  This paper investigates the possibility that a VCG mechanism is regarded as being 
price-based in the sense that, instead of directly announcing the entire valuation 
function, each buyer reveals partial information by making demand responses to a 
limited number of price vectors that the auctioneer asks him/her. 
 
                                                 
5  See Vickery (1961), Clarke (1971), and Groves (1973). 
6  See Rothkopf, Teisberg, and Kahn (1990), Milgrom (2004), and Ausubel and Milgrom (2006). 12 
 
3. Price-Demand Sets 
 




ii i a A p pa R   , where we 
assume that  ()0 i i pa  , and 
( 4 )      () () ii ii p ap a    if  ii aa    and  ii aa   . 
It is appropriate to assume that any price vector  i p  that the auctioneer asks of any 
buyer  i will satisfy inequalities (4), because any increase in amount of items has a 
positive value, i.e., because any valuation function  ii uU   satisfies inequalities (1). 
Let us denote  i P   as the set of all such price vectors for buyer  i. 
 A  price-demand set for buyer  iN   is defined as a non-empty and compact 
subset, denoted by 
    ii i EP A . 
Each element  ( , ) ii p a  of price-demand set  i E  implies that the auctioneer asks price 
vector  i p  to buyer i, and in response buyer  i reveals his/her demand  i a . Instead of 
requesting any buyer  iN   to directly announce his/her entire valuation function  i u , 
the auctioneer collects partial information about it through the observation of 
price-demand set  i E . 
  Let us denote by  ( ) ii i UE U   the set of valuation functions for buyer  i that is 
consistent with price-demand set  E , i.e., according to which, for every  ( , ) ii i p aE  , 
buyer  ' is  demand  i a   maximizes his/her payoff. This can be expressed as 
    (){ | a r g m a x { () () } (,) }
ii
ii i ii i i i i i i i
aA
U E u U a u a p a for all p a E

   

 , 
where we assume that he behaves as a price taker. By observing any price-demand set 
i E , the auctioneer recognizes that the valuation function of buyer i is included in 
() ii UE, but he/she does not know which valuation function in  ( ) ii UE is the correct 
one. Note that for every  ( ) ii i uU E  , 
    argmax{ ( ) ( )}
ii
ii i i i
aA




  for  all  ( , ) ii i i p PaE  . 13 
 
Throughout this paper, we confine our attention to price-demand sets  i E  such that 
() ii UE  is non-empty, i.e.,  ( ) ii UE   . This implies a revealed-preference activity rule, 
according to which, any buyer is restricted to make his/her demand responses consistent 
with a single valuation function. 
  Let us define  ( , ) ii i i PaE P   as the convex hull of the closure of the set 
{| ( , ) } iii i i p Pp a E   of all price vectors for buyer i  that the auctioneer asks of 
him/her in price-demand set  i E . Note that given any valuation function in  ( ) ii UE and 
any price vector  ( , ) ii i i p PaE  , buyer  ' is  demand  i a  maximizes his/her payoff. Let 
us denote by  ( ) ii i AE A    the set of all allocations for buyer  i such  that  ( , ) ii i PaE   , 
i.e., the set of all demands that buyer  i  reveals in price-demand set  i E . Let us denote 
i iN E E
  , 
\{ }
i
j jN i EE
  ,  () ( ) ii iN A EA E
   and 
\{ } () ()
ii
jj jN i AE AE
  . Moreover, let 
us define 






  . 
  A price-demand set  i E  for buyer iN   is said to be connected if for every 
{,} () ii ii p pP E   , there exists a continuous function  :[0,1] ( ) ii i PE    such that 
(0) ii p    and  (1) ii p    . Throughout this paper, we confine our attention to 
price-demand sets that are connected. 
  A price-demand set satisfies the connectedness if the auctioneer changes his/her 
ask price vector continuously. Hence, the clock auction that traces a single ascending 
linear price trajectory, to which Gul and Stacchetti (2000) have limited their attention, 
always induces connected price-demand sets. More generally, a price-demand set 
satisfies the connectedness if the auctioneer never makes his/her ask price vector jump 
discontinuously to any price vector that he has never asked before; i.e., if he/she either 
changes his/her ask price vector continuously or jumps to any price vector that he/she 
has asked before. Hence, the dynamical clock auction studied by Ausubel (2006), which 
traces multiple ascending price trajectories, always induces connected price-demand 
sets, provided that these trajectories start with the same price vector. 
  Let us denote by  2
ii PA
i
   the set of all connected price-demand sets for buyer 14 
 
iN   such  that  ( ) ii UE   . Let  () ( ) ii iN UE U E
   , 
\{ } () ()
ii
jj jN i UE UE
  , and 
i iN  . The following lemma shows that the auctioneer can correctly calculate the 
difference in valuation between any pair of packages whenever these packages are 
revealed in the connected price-demand set. 
 
Lemma 1: For every  iN  , every  ii E  , and every  {,} ( ) ii i i aa AE   , there uniquely 
exists  (,, ) iii i x aaE R    such  that 
    (,, ) () () iii i ii ii x aaE ua ua    for  all  () ii i uU E  . 
 
Proof: Since  i E  is connected, we can select a continuous function  :[0,1] ( ) ii i PE    
such that 
    ( 0 )( , ) ii i i PaE    and  (1) ( , ) ii i i PaE    . 
In this case, we can select finite sequences  1 (( ) )
m
m tm   and  1 (() )
m
im am   such  that 
    ()[ 0 , 1 ] tm  and  ( ) ( ) ii i am AE   for  all  {1,..., } mm  , 
    (1) (2) 0 tt   ,  (1 ) ( ) 1 tm tm   , 
    (1 ) ( ) tm tm    for  all  {1,..., 1} mm   , 
    ( 1 ) ii aa  ,  () ii am a   , 
and 
    ( )( ( ) , ) ii ii tP a m E    for  all  {2,..., 1} mm    and  all  [( ) ,( 1 ) ] tt m t m  . 
Let us specify 
   
2
( , , ) { ( ( ))( ( 1)) ( ( ))( ( ))}
m
iii i i i i i
m
x a a E t ma m t ma m 

    . 
Let us consider an arbitrary valuation function  ( ) ii i uU E  . For every  {2,..., } mm  , 
since 
    ( ( ) )( ( ) , ) ii i i tm Pa m E    and  ( ( )) ( ( 1), ) ii i i tm Pa m E    , 
it follows that 
    ( ( )) ( ( ))( ( )) ( ( 1)) ( ( ))( ( 1)) ii i i ii i i uam t m am uam t m am       . 
Hence, the difference in valuation between  ( ) i am and  ( 1) i am   is equivalent to the 15 
 
difference in price between them, i.e., 
    (() ) (( 1 ) ) ( () ) (() ) ( () ) (( 1 ) ) ii ii i i i i u a m u a m tm a m tm a m       , 
which implies that 
   
2
( , , ) { ( ( 1)) ( ( ))}
m
iii i ii ii
m
x aaE uam uam

     
    ( ( 1 ) )( ( ) ) ii ii ua uam  () () ii ii ua ua    . 
Q.E.D. 
 
  In the proof of Lemma 1, the connectedness of the price-demand set plays the 
central role for the unique determination of difference in valuation; the connectedness 
guarantees that the difference in valuation is equivalent to the summation of price 
differences. Concepts that are related to connectedness can be found in the dynamical 
clock auctions studied by Ausubel (2006) and in the universal competitive equilibrium 
studied by Parkes (2006) and Mishra and Parkes (2007). 
  Any price-demand set reveals only partial information about a buyer’s valuation 
function; the absolute term of valuations is not revealed unless the null demand  i a  is 
revealed. Provided that the auctioneer never asks extremely high price vectors, it is a 
typical thing for any winning buyer  iN   that  () i ii aA E   That is, buyer  i does not 
reveal the null demand  i a . In this case, the auctioneer can collect information only 
about the relative term of valuations; no buyer ever reveals his/her absolute valuations. 
Provided that the null demand is not revealed, for every  ( ) ii i uU E   and every  0   , 
it holds that  , i u    is always included in  ( ) ii UE, where  , i u   is  defined  as 
    , ()0 i i ua   , 
and 
    , () () ii i i ua u a     for  all  \{ } i ii aAa  . 
Hence, the auctioneer cannot distinguish how strongly each buyer prefers any non-null 
package to the null package. 16 
 
4. Price-Based Mechanisms 
 
 A  price-demand scheme is defined as  ( ) : iiNU     , where for every 
uU   and  every  \{ } uU u   , 
    () () uu      if  (() ) uU u    . 
If each buyer  iN   behaves as if his/her true valuation function is given by  i u  , then 
the auctioneer observes the price-demand set  ( ) ii Eu    , recognizes that buyer  ' is  
true valuation function is included in  ( ) ii UE, but does not know which valuation 
function in  ( ) ii UE  is the correct one. The concept of the price-demand scheme should 
be distinct from the naïve message space reduction, because information feedback is 
allowed in that the price-demand set  ( ) i u    for each buyer iN   is generally 
dependent on not only  i u   but  also 
i u  . 
  The concept of the price-demand scheme applies to many price-based auction 
formats for a wide area without remaining in the already examined formats such as the 
dynamical clock auction by Ausubel (2006) or the primal-dual algorithm by Parkes 
(2006) and Mishra and Parkes (2007).
7 Most studies have investigated the possibility 
that the auctioneer discovers the competitive equilibrium price vector and asks this to 
the buyers. In contrast, the present paper studies price-demand schemes that are not 
necessarily aimed at discovering the competitive equilibrium price vector; the 
auctioneer can achieve efficiency without suggesting the competitive equilibrium price 
vector to the buyers. 
A mechanism  G  is said to be price-based for a price-demand scheme    if for 
every  uU   and  every  \{ } uU u   , 
   (() , ( () ) ) (() , ( () ) ) ii N ii N gu qu gu qu    whenever  () () uu     . 
                                                 
7  With the restriction of revealed preference activity rule, a basic characteristic of a price-based 
auction format can be almost summarized by a price-demand scheme. In order to connect the 
already examined auction formats with the formulations of this paper in a more precise manner, 
it might be appropriate to define the concept of price-demand scheme, not as a single-valued 
function, but as a set-valued function on   . The contents of this paper do not change basically 
even if we change the definition of price-demand scheme in this manner, unless the analysis of 
this paper becomes complicated. 17 
 
The determination of  ( ( ),( ( )) ) ii N gu qu    depends only on the observed profile  () u    of 
price-demand sets. In order to implement a mechanism that is price-based for   , the 
auctioneer does not need to know any more information than  () u  . Let us denote 
    \{ } () ( () )
i
j jN i uu    , 
    (){ |( ) } UE u E f o r s o m e u U      , 
(){ | ( ) } ii i i i U E u E for someu U      , 
and 
    ( ) { | ( ) }
ii i j j U E u E for someu U      . 
The following proposition shows a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence 
of the price-based VCG mechanism; it is necessary and sufficient that the efficient 
allocation and the efficient allocations without any single buyer are all revealed in the 
observed profile of price-demand sets. 
 
Proposition 2: For every price-demand scheme   , there exists a VCG mechanism  G  
that is price-based for    if and only if for every  () E U   , there exist  () () aE AE   
and  () ()
ii ii aE AE   for  each iN   such  that 
(5)    
* () () aE A u   for  all  () uU E  , 
and for every  iN  , 
(6)    
* () ( )
ij ii aE Au   for  all  ()
ii i uU E  . 
 
Proof: We prove the “if” part as follows. Suppose that for every  () E U   , there exist 
() () aE AE   a n d   () ()
ii ii aE AE   for each iN   that satisfy properties (5) and (6). 
Then, we can specify  : gU A   by 
    () (() ) g uau    for  all uU  . 
From Lemma 1, for every  iN  , we can specify  : i qU R   by 
   
\{ }




qu xa u a u u  

   for  all uU  . 
Note from Lemma 1 and property (6) that 
   
\{ } \{ }
() m a x ( ) (() )
ii ij j j
aAjN i jN i
qu ua u gu
 
  . 18 
 
Hence, the correspondingly specified mechanism  ( ,( ) ) iiN Gg q    is  VCG. 
  We prove the “only if” part as follows. Suppose that  ( ,( ) ) iiN Gg q     is VCG and 
price-based for   , where we assumed that 
   
* () () gu A u   for  all uU  . 
From inequalities (1) and (4), it follows that whenever { , } ( ) ii i i aa AE   , then there 
exists { , } ( ) ii i i uu UE    such  that 
    () () () () ii ii ii ii ua ua ua ua     . 
Hence, for every uU  , if either  () (() ) gu A u    or 
* (( ) ) ()
jj jj Au A u      for 
some  jN  , then there exist  jN   and  j j uU    such  that 
    (,) ( )
j
j uu u    , 
and for every  \{ } iN j  , 
   
\{ , } \{ , }
( , ) m a x { ( )( ) } { ( ( ) )( ( ) ) }
ii
j
ij jj hh j j hh
aA hN ij hN ij
quu ua ua u gu u gu
 
        
   
\{ } \{ }
max ( ) ( ( ))
ii hh hh




    ( ) i qu  . 
This contradicts the supposition that  G  is price-based for   . Hence, we have proved 
that for every  uU  , 
    () (() ) gu A u   , and 
* (( ) ) ()
jj jj Au A u      for  all  jN  . 
  Suppose that there exist  uU  ,  uU   ,  jN  , and 
j j aA   such  that 
    () () uu     , 
* (( ) ) ()
jj j j j aA u A u    , and 
*()
jj j aA u   . 
In this case, without loss of generality, we can select  (() ) uU u     satisfying  that 
   
\{ } \{ }
() m a x ( ) ( () )
jj ji i i i





    
\{ } \{ }
() (( ) )
j
ii ii
iN j iN j
ua ugu

   . 
Since  () (() ) gu A u    and  ( ( ))
jj j aA u   , it follows that 
   
\{ } \{ } \{ } \{ }
() (( ) ) () (( ) ) ( )
jj
ii ii ii ii i
i N ji N j i N ji N j
ua ugu ua ugu qu
 
     , 
which implies that  ( ) ( ) ii qu qu   . This contradicts the supposition that G  is 19 
 
price-based for   . Hence, we have proved that for every  uU   and  every  jN  , 
   
*
(( ) )








  . 
  From the above observations, we have proved the “only if” part, i.e., properties (5) 
and (6) are necessary for the existence of the price-based VCG mechanism. 
Q.E.D. 
 
  Because of Lemma 1, the connectedness of price-demand set guarantees that the 
difference in valuation between any pair of packages in the efficient allocation and the 
efficient allocations without any single buyer can be calculated as being equivalent to 
the summation of price differences, provided all these allocations are revealed. Hence, 
the observation of the profile of price-demand sets is sufficient for implementing the 
VCG mechanism. 20 
 
5. Representative Valuations 
 
  The drawback of the necessary and sufficient condition in Proposition 2 is that for 
any observed price-demand set  ( ) ii EU   , the auctioneer has to examine all the 
possibilities of valuation functions in  ( ) ii UE  about whether the efficient allocation and 
the efficient allocations without any single buyer are revealed. However, we can show 
that this rather intractable condition can be replaced with a much simpler one; what we 
need to do for this sufficiency is to examine just a particular single valuation function 
named the representative valuation function. For buyer  iN   and every price-demand 
set  ii E  , we specify the representative valuation function, denoted by 
[] i E
ii uU  , as 
follows, where we assume that 
[] ()0
i E
i i ua  , 
and we fix an arbitrary allocation  ( ) ii i aA E    for  buyer i; for every  ( )\{ } ii i i aA E a   , 
   
[] [] () () (,, )
ii EE
i i i i iii i uauax a a E   , 
and for every  ( ) ii i aA E  , 
   
[] []




ii ii i i i i pa E ua uap ap a
 
   . 
Note that the representative valuation function associated with  ii E  , i.e., 
[] i E
i u , 
uniquely exists, and is included in  ( ) ii UE. As the following lemma shows, the 
representative valuation function 
[] i E
i u  assigns any revealed demand  ( ) ii i aA E   with 
the minimal possible valuation in both absolute and relative terms. 
 
Lemma 3: For every  () ii i uU E   and  every  () ii i aA E  , 
   
[] () ()
i E
ii i i ua u a  , 
and for every  ii aA  , 
   
[] [] () () () ()
ii EE
i ii iiiii u au auaua    , 
where 
   
[] () ()
i E
ii i i ua u a   if  () i ii aA E  , 
and 21 
 
   
[] [] () () () ()
ii EE
i ii i iiii u au auaua     if  () ii i aA E  . 
 
Proof: It is clear from the specification of 
[] i E
i u  that 
   
[] [] () () () ()
ii EE
i ii iiiii u au auaua    , 
and 
   
[] [] () () () ()
ii EE
i ii i iiii u au auaua     if  ( ) ii i aA E  . 
By letting  i i aa   , it is clear from 
[] () ()0
i E
ii ii ua u a    that 
   
[] () ()
i E
ii i i ua u a  , 
and 
   
[] () ()
i E
ii i i ua u a   if  () i ii aA E  . 
Q.E.D. 
 
  Let us denote 
[] [] ()
i E E
ii N uu   . The following theorem shows that the necessary 
and sufficient condition (5) and (6) in Proposition 2 can be replaced with a simpler 
condition, which implies that, associated with the profile 
[] E u  of the representative 
valuation functions, there exist an efficient allocation  () () aE AE   and efficient 
allocations without any single buyer, i.e.,  ( ) ( )
jj jj aE AE   for each  jN  , that are 
revealed in the observed profile  E  of price-demand sets. Hence, what we have to do 
for this sufficiency is to examine just about 
[] E u . 
 
Theorem 4: For every price-demand scheme   , there exists a VCG mechanism that is 
price-based for   if and only if for every  () E U   , there exist  () () aE AE   and 
() ()
jj jj aE AE   for  each  jN   such  that 
(7)    
*[ ] () ( )
E aE A u  , 
and for every  jN  , 
(8)    
*[ ] () ( )
jj j E j aE Au  . 
 
Proof: It is clear from Lemma 3 the specification of 
[] E u  that for every iN  , every 22 
 
() ii i aA E  , and every  ii aA   , 
   
[] [] () () () ()
ii EE
iiiii ii i uauau au a     for  all  ( ) ii i uU E  . 
Hence, for every  () aA E  , 
   
*() aA u   for  all  () uU E   whenever 
*[ ] ()
E aA u  . 
Since 
[] ()
E uU E  , property (5) is equivalent to property (7). Moreover, it follows in 
the same manner that for every  ( )
jj j aA E  , 
   
*()
jj j aA u   for  all  ( )
jj j uU E   whenever 
*[ ] () ( )
jj j E j aE Au  . 
Since 
[] ()
Ej j j uU E  , property (6) is equivalent to property (8). 
Q.E.D. 
 
  The proof of Theorem 4 showed that the efficient allocation and the efficient 
allocations without any single buyer that are induced by the profile 
[] E u  of 
representative valuation functions can be induced also by any profile  () uU E   of 
valuation functions that are consistent with  E , if, and only if, these allocations are all 
revealed in  E . This implies to check the existence of the price-based VCG mechanism, 
we should examine just about 
[] E u . 
 Practically,  after  continuing to ask price vectors to the buyers and observing any 
price-demand set  E in consequences, the auctioneer calculates the representative 
valuation 
[] i E
i u  for each buyer  iN  . The auctioneer calculates the efficient allocation 
and the efficient allocations without any single buyer that are induced by 
[] E u , and 
finds out whether these allocations are all revealed. If the auctioneer ascertains that 
these allocations are revealed, then he/she stops asking price vectors promptly, and 
achieves the efficient allocation. In this case, he/she also calculates the VCG payments, 
and transfers them from the buyers to the seller. On the other hand, if he/she ascertains 
that some of these allocations are not revealed, then he/she continues to ask price 





  This section investigates the possibility that there exists a price-based mechanism 
that is efficient and strategy-proof, but is not necessarily VCG, i.e., does not necessarily 
satisfy ex-post individual rationality. Let us denote by  (() )
ii ia A ii pp a    the zero price 
vector, where  ()0 i i pa  for all  ii aA  . In this section and the next one, we focus on 
price-demand schemes     such that the auctioneer asks very low price vectors that are 
close to 
i p , i.e., 
(9)     (( ) ) ii i p Pu    for  all uU   and  all iN  . 
Let us denote by  ii aA   the  maximal package for buyer  i, where 
    iz z am   for  all  {1,..., } zl  . 
Note from inequalities (1) that any buyer  i  reveals the maximal package  i a  as  his/her 
demand response to any virtually zero price vector, which along with property (9) 
implies that it is certain that he/she reveals the maximal package  i a , i.e.,   
    (( ) ) ii i aA u    for  all uU  . 
The following lemma shows that for any price-based mechanism to be efficient, it is 
necessary that the allocation that is induced by the mechanism is revealed in the 
resulting price-demand sets at all times. 
 
Lemma 5:  Suppose that   satisfies property (9) and that a mechanism G  is 
price-based for   . If  G  is  efficient,  then 
    () (() ) gu A u    for  all iN  . 
 
Proof: Suppose that there exist  uU   and iN   such  that 
    ( )( ( ) ) ii i gu A u   . 
Note that  () i i gu a   in this case; if not, then, it follows from  () ( () ) i i ii gu A u a     
that 
   
*
, () ( , )
i
i gu A u u    for  all  0   , 24 
 




i aA uu    satisfies 
i i aa   whenever    is selected to be sufficiently large. 
 Since  () i i gu a  , we can select  \{ ( )} iii aAg u   such that  ( ) ii ag u  , and for 
every \{ , ( )} iii i aAa g u  , 
    (( ) ) () (( ) ) () ii ii ii ii ugu ua ugu ua    if  ( ) ii ag u   . 
Note from inequalities (1) that we can select  ( ( ))\{ } ii i i uU u u    and  \{} jNi   such 
that ( ( )) ( ) ii ii ugu ua     is close to zero enough to satisfy that 
(10)     (( ) ) ( ) (( ) ( ) ) (( ) ) i i i i jj i i jj ugu ua ugu gu a ugu     . 
Let us specify  ˆ aA   by 
    ˆii aa  , 
    ˆ () () j ji i ag ug ua  , and 
    ˆ () hh ag u   for  all  \{, } hNi j  . 
From inequality (10), 
   
\{ } \{ }
ˆˆ ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ii hh ii hh
hN i hN i
ugu ugu ua ua

    , 
which contradicts the fact that  () gu  is efficient for  (,)
i
i uu  . 
Q.E.D. 
 
  The following proposition shows that for an efficient, strategy-proof, and 
price-based mechanism to exist, it is necessary and sufficient that any resulting 
price-demand set E   reveals the efficient allocation for the profile 
[] E u  of 
representative valuation functions. In contrast to the VCG mechanisms, we do not 
require the efficient allocations without any single buyer to be revealed. 
 
Proposition 6:  Suppose that price-demand scheme   satisfies property (9). Then, 
there exists an efficient and strategy-proof mechanism that is price-based for    if  and 
only if for every  () E U   , there exists  () () aE AE   such  that 
(11)   
*[ ] () ( )
E aE A u  . 
 25 
 
Proof: The proof of the “only if” part of this theorem is straightforward from Lemma 5, 
because the equality of  (() ) () au g u    satisfies property (11). We prove the “if” part 
as follows. Suppose that for every  () E U   , there exists  () () aE AE   that satisfies 
property (11). We specify an efficient mechanism  G  by 
    () (() ) g uau    for  all uU  , 
and 
   
\{ }
( ) ( , ( ( )), ( )) i jjj j
jN i
qu xaa u u 

   for  all uU  . 
From Lemma 1 and  {, () } (() ) ii ii agu A u   ,  (, ( ) , ( ) ) iii i x agu u   is well-defined. From 
Lemma 1, it follows that 
   
\{ }
() { ( ) ( () ) } ij j j j
jN i
qu ua u gu

  , 
and therefore, 
    ( ( )) ( ) { ( ( , )) ( , )}
jj
ii i i i i u g uq uu g u u q u u     
   
\{ } \{ }
( ( )) ( ) { ( ( , )) ( )}
i
jj jj jj i jj
jN jN i jN jN i
ugu ua ugu u ua
 
        






     for  all  ii uU   . 




7. Participation Constraints 
 
  This section considers the situation where the profile of valuation functions  uU   
is randomly determined according to a probability measure  f  on U . Let us denote by 
[]
f E   and  [| ]
f
i E u   the expectation operator in the ex-ante term and the expectation 
operator in the interim term conditional on  ii uU  , respectively. 
 A  mechanism  G  is said to satisfy participation constraints if each buyer has 
incentive to participate in the allocation problem in the interim term, i.e., 
(12)     [((,) ) (,) |]0
fii
iii ii i Eug u u q u u u    for  all iN   and  all  ii uU  , 
and the seller has incentive to participate in the allocation problem in the ex-ante term, 
i.e., 






   . 
The efficient and strategy-proof price-based mechanism that was specified in the proof 
of Theorem 6 does not satisfy participation constraints. The following theorem shows 
that whenever the buyers’ valuation functions are independently distributed, we can 
design an alternative, efficient, strategy-proof, and price-based mechanism that satisfies 
participation constraints. 
 
Theorem 7: Suppose that price-demand scheme     satisfies property (9), and that the 
buyers’ valuation functions are independently distributed. Then, there exists an efficient 
and strategy-proof mechanism that is price-based for   and satisfies participation 
constraints if and only if for every  () E U   , there exists  () () aE AE   that satisfies 
property (11). 
 
Proof: From Theorem 6, all we have to do is to prove the “if” part of this theorem. 
Since the buyers’ valuation functions are independently distributed, it follows that 
[| ]
f
i E u   is independent of  i u . Hence, for every  iN  , we can specify a real number 
f
i DR   by 
   
*
\{ }
[{ ( ) ( ) } | ]
ff i
ij j j j i
jN i
DE u au au

   for  all  ii uU  . 27 
 
Let us specify a mechanism  G  by 
    () (() ) g uau    for  all uU  , 
and 
   
\{ }
() ( , (() ) , () )
f
i jjj j i
jN i
qu xaa u u D 

   for  all uU  . 
In the same manner as in the proof of Theorem 6, we can prove that the specified 
mechanism  G   is efficient and strategy-proof. Note that 
   
\{ }
[ ( )| ] [ ( , ( ( )), ( ))| ]
f ff
i i jjj j i i
jN i
E qu u E xaa u u u D 

   
   
\{ }
[{ ( ) ( ( ) ) } | ]
f f
j jj j ii
jN i
E ua ugu u D

    
   
*
\{ }
[ { ( ) ( ( ))}| ]
fi
j jj j i
jN i
E ua ugu u

  , 
which is nonnegative. Hence, 
   
*
\{ }
[(( ) ) ( ) |] [ ( ( ) ) ( ) |]0
ffi
ii i i j j jj i
jN jN i
Eug u q uu E ugu ua u

     , 
and 
   
*
\{ }
[( ) ][ [{ ( ) ( ( ) ) } ] ] 0
ff i
ij j j j
iN iN jN i
Eq u E u a u g u
 
    , 
which imply inequalities (12) and (13), respectively 
Q.E.D. 
 
  By replacing ex-post individual rationality with participation constraints, we can 
dramatically simplify the manner of designing an efficient and strategy-proof 
mechanism; we do not need to require the allocations without any single buyer to be 
revealed. For instance, when the buyers have substitutes preferences, we can design a 
clock auction that is strategy-proof, satisfies participation constraints, and traces just a 
single ascending linear price trajectory. This is in contrast with the case of ex-post 
individual rationality; as Gul and Stacchetti (2000) and Ausubel (2006) have explained, 
with the restriction of ex-post individual rationality, it is generally impossible for any 




8. Approximate Strategy-Proofness 
 
A mechanism  G   is said to be strictly price-based for a price-demand scheme    
if it is price-based for   , and 
   () (() ) gu A u    for  all uU  . 
These inequalities imply that the allocation  () gu induced by the mechanism G  is 
revealed in the profile  () u   of price-demand sets at all times. Note from Theorem 4 
that if a VCG mechanism is price-based for a price-demand scheme  , then it is 
strictly price-based for  . Note also from Lemma 5 that if   satisfies property (9) 
and mechanism  G  is efficient and price-based for   , then  G  is strictly price-based 
for   . 
  This section investigates a general class of strictly price-based mechanisms that are 
not necessarily efficient or strategy-proof. For every  0   , a mechanism  G   is said to 
be   strategy-proof if for every  uU   and  every iN  , 
(14)     (( ) ) ( ) ((,) ) (,)
ii
ii i iii ii ugu qu uguu quu       for  all  ii uU   . 
With the selection of     to be close to zero, the   strategy-proofness implies that the 
mechanism is, not exactly, but approximately, strategy-proof. The following proposition 
shows a necessary and sufficient condition for a strictly price-based mechanism to be 
 strategy-proof. 
 
Proposition 8:  Suppose that a mechanism G   is strictly price-based for a 
price-demand scheme  . Then, it is   strategy-proof if and only if for every 
() E U   , every  iN  , every  ()
ii i uU E  , and every  ii uU   , 
   
[] [] [] [] (( ,) ) ( ,) ((,) ) (,)
ii i i EE E E ii i i
ii i i i ii i i i ug uu q uuug u u q u u     . 
 
Proof: The proof of the “only if” part is straightforward from the definition of 
  strategy-proofness. We prove the “only if” part as follows. Note from the 
specification of 
[] i E
i u   that for every  ( ) ii i uU E  , every  ( ) ii i aA E  , and every  ii aA  , 
   
[] [] () () () ()
ii EE
i ii iiiii u au auaua    , 29 
 
which, along with 
[] (, ) ( , ) ( )
i E ii
ii ii i i gu u guu AE   and 
[] (, )( , )
i E ii
ii ii qu u quu  , implies 
that 
    ((,) ) (,){ ((,) ) (,) }
ii ii
iii ii i ii ii u g u uq u uu g u uq u u     
   
[] [] (( ,) ) ( ,){((,) ) (,) }
ii EE ii i i
iii ii iii ii ugu u qu u uguu quu      
   
[] [] [] [] (( ,) ) ( ,){ ((,) ) (,) }
ii i i EE E E ii i i
i ii ii i ii ii ug uu q uu ug u u q u u      
      . 
Hence, we have proved that for every  uU   and  every iN  , 
    (( ) ) ( ) ((,) ) (,)
ii
ii i iii ii ugu qu uguu quu       for  all  ii uU   . 
Q.E.D. 
  
  Proposition 8 implies that it is sufficient to examine whether the incentive 
constraint (14) is satisfied for the case of representative valuation functions. The 
representative valuation function assigns the minimal relative valuations for revealed 
packages. This makes the incentive constraint for the representative valuation function 
the severest among all possible valuation functions that are consistent with the observed 
price-demand set. The following proposition shows a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the existence of approximately strategy-proof and strictly price-based mechanism. 
The necessary and sufficient condition, which is given by inequalities (16), implies that 
a buyer cannot necessarily increase his/her gain by interchanging his/her manner of 
making demand responses between any pair of distinct representative valuation 
functions.  
 
Proposition 9: Suppose that a price-demand scheme     and an allocation function  g  
satisfy that for every  uU   and  every  \{ } uU u   , 
    () (() ) gu A u   , 
and 
(15)     () () gu gu    for  all  (() ) uU u    . 
Then, for every  0   , there exists a profile of payment functions  () iiN q   such  that  the 
associated mechanism  (, () ) iiN Gg q     is strictly price-based for   and  is 30 
 
 strategy-proof, if and only if for every  () E U   , every  iN  , every  ()
ii i uU E  , 
and every  () ii E U     such  that  (,)
i
ii i E uu      for  some  ii uU   , it holds that 
(16)    
[] [] [] [] (( ,) ) (( ,) )
ii ii EE EE ii
ii i ii i ug uu ug uu 

. 
   
[] [] [] [] (( ,) ) (( ,) )2
ii ii EE EE ii




Proof:  Suppose that  ( ,( ) ) iiN Gg q     is strictly price-based for   and  is 
 strategy-proof. Then, for every  () E U   , every iN  , every  ( )
ii i uU E  , and 
every  () ii E U     such  that  (,)
i
ii i E uu      for  some  ii uU   , 
(17)    
[] [] [] [] [] [] (( ,) ) ( ,) (( ,) ) ( ,)
ii i ii i EE E EE E ii ii




(18)    
[] [] [] [] [] [] (( ,) ) ( ,) (( ,) ) ( ,)
ii i ii i EE E EE E ii ii
ii i i i ii i i i ug uu q uuug uu q uu  
  
. 
By summing these inequalities, we have inequality (16). 
  Suppose that inequalities (16) hold. Then, there exist 
[] (, )
i E i







   
[] [] [] [] (( ,) ) (( ,) )
ii ii EE EE ii
ii i ii i ug uu ug uu  
 [] [] (, )(, )
ii EE ii
ii ii qu u qu u 

 
   
[] [] [] [] {( (, ) ) ( (, ) )}
ii ii EE EE ii
ii i ii i ug uu ug uu    
 
, 
which implies inequalities (17) and (18). Without loss of generality, from equalities (15), 
we can select 
[] (, )
i E i
ii qu u  for each  ( ) ii EU    and each 
ii uU   such that for every 
ii uU   , 
   
[] [] (, )(, )
ii EE ii
ii ii qu u qu u    whenever 
[] [] (, )(, )
ii EE ii
ii uu uu    . 
Hence, we can specify  i q  by 
   
[() ] () ( )
u
ii qu qu
   for  all uU  . 
It is clear that the specified mechanism  ( ,( ) ) iiN gq   is strictly price-based for   . From 





9. Indirect Mechanisms 
 
  This section considers a general class of indirect mechanisms, and examines 
whether the price-based property is consistent with the Nash equilibrium, efficiency, 
and core. The aspect of representative valuation function that the minimal valuations in 
the relative term are assigned to any revealed package plays the central role even in this 
examination. An indirect mechanism is defined as  ( ,( , ) ) ii i N Hh S r   , where  i S  
denotes the set of messages for buyer  i,  i iN SS
   ,  : hS A   implies the allocation 
function, and  : i rS R   implies the payment function for each buyer iN  . Let us 
denote ( ) ( ( )) ii N hs h s   . Let us denote a message profile by  ( ) iiN ss S    . Note that a 
direct mechanism  ( ,( ) ) iiN Gg q    is regarded as a special case of indirect mechanism 
(, ( ,) ) ii i N Hh S r   , where  ii SU  ,  ii hg  , and  ii rq   for  all iN  . 
A strategy for buyer  i is defined as a function  : ii US   , according to which, 
buyer  i  announces message  ( ) ii uS    when the profile of the buyers’ valuation 
functions is given by uU  . Here, we take into account the case of complete 
information, where  ( ) i u    depends on not only  i u  but  also 
i u . Let  ( ) ( ( )) ii N uu      
and  \{ } () ( () )
i
j jN i uu    . Let  i   denote the set of all strategies for buyer i. Let 
() iiN S      denote a strategy profile. Let  i iN    denote the set of all strategy 
profiles. 
  A combination of an indirect mechanism and a strategy profile  (,) H   is said to 
be price-based for a price-demand scheme     if for every  uU   and  every uU   , 
    () () uu      whenever  () () uu     . 
A combination of an indirect mechanism and a strategy profile  (,) H   is said to be 
strictly price-based for a price-demand scheme    if it is price-based for   , and for 
every  uU  ,         




9.1 Nash equilibrium 
 
 A  message  profile  sS   is said to be a Nash equilibrium in the game given by a 
combination of an indirect mechanism and a profile of valuation functions  (, ) H u  if 
for every  iN  , 
    (() ) () ((, ) ) (, )
ii
ii i i i i uh s rs uh ss rss     for  all  ii sS   . 
A strategy profile   is said to be a universal Nash equilibrium in indirect 
mechanism  H  if for every  uU  , the message profile  () u   is a Nash equilibrium 
in  (, ) H u . The following proposition shows that under the constraint of the strictly 
price-based property, for a universal Nash equilibrium strategy profile, it is sufficient to 
examine just about profiles of representative valuation functions. 
 
Proposition 10: Suppose that a combination of an indirect mechanism and a strategy 
profile  (,) H   is strictly price-based for a price-demand scheme  . Then,   is a 
universal Nash equilibrium in H  if and only if for every  () E U   , the message 
profile 
[] ()
E u    is a Nash equilibrium in 
[] (, )
E Hu .  
 
Proof: The “only if” part is straightforward from the definition of the universal Nash 
equilibrium. Let us consider any  () uU E   and iN  . Note from Lemma 3 that for 
every ( ) ii i aA E  , and every  ii aA  , 
   
[] [] () () () ()
ii EE
i ii iiiii u au auaua    , 
which, along with 
[] () ( )
E uu    and 
[] (( ) ) ()
E hE uA   , implies that 
    ((() ) ) (() ) {((, () ) ) (, () ) }
ii
ii i i i i u h ur uu h sur su       
   
[] [] [] [] ( ( ( ))) ( ( )) { ( ( , ( ))) ( , ( ))}
EE i Ei E
ii i i i i u h ur uu h s ur s u        
   
[] [] [] [] [] [] ( ( ( ))) ( ( )) { ( ( , ( ))) ( , ( ))}
ii EE EE i Ei E
ii i i i i u h ur uu h s ur s u        
    0  . 





9.2. Efficiency and Core 
 
A strategy profile     is said to be efficient in an indirect mechanism  H  if  for 
every  uU  , the allocation  (() ) hu A     that is induced by the message profile  () u   
is efficient for u. The following proposition shows that under the constraint of the 
strictly price-based property, for an efficient strategy profile, it is sufficient to examine 
just about profiles of representative valuation functions. 
 
Proposition 11: Suppose that a combination of an indirect mechanism and a strategy 
profile  (,) H   is strictly price-based for a price-demand scheme  . Then,   is 
efficient in  H   if and only if for every  () E U   , the allocation 
[] ()
E u    is efficient in 
[] (, )
E Hu .  
 
Proof: The “only if” part is straightforward from the definition of efficiency in terms of 
strategy profile. We can prove the “if” part in the same manner as the proof of Theorem 
4. It is clear from Lemma 3 that for every  iN  , every  ( ) ii i aA E  , every  ii aA   , and 
() ii uU E  , 
   
[] [] () () () ()
ii EE
i ii iiiii u au auaua    . 
Hence, for every  () aA E  , 
   
*() aA u   for  all  () uU E   whenever 
*[ ] ()
E aA u  , 
which, along with 
[] (( ) ) ()
E hu A E   , 
[] * [] (( ) ) ( )
EE hu A u   , and 
[] (( ) ) (() )
E hu hu    
for all  () uU E  , implies that for every  () E u    and  every  () uU E  , 
   
* (() ) () hu A u   . 
Q.E.D. 
 
  Let us define a characteristic function  :2
N
u WR   for a profile of valuation 
functions  uU   by 34 
 







  for  all NN   , 
which implies that the maximal aggregate value that a coalition  {0} N    can achieve 
by excluding any buyer who does not belong to this coalition. Let us denote by 
{0} () iiN vv R     a payoff vector, where  0 v  implies the seller’s payoff, and for each 
iN  ,  i v  implies  buyer  ' is   payoff. A payoff vector  v  is said to be in the core for a 
profile of valuation functions  uU  , if it is induced by an efficient allocation, and it is 
not blocked by any coalition, i.e., 


















  for  all NN   . 
Let us denote by  {0} (, , )((, , ) ) ii N vHus v Hus R     the payoff vector induced by a 
message profile  sS   in  the  game (, ) H u , where 
    0(, , ) ( ( ) ) i
iN




    ( ,,) (() ) (() ) ii i vHu s uh s vh s  for  all iN  . 
A strategy profile   is said to be compatible with the core in an indirect 
mechanism  H  if for every  uU  , the induced payoff vector  (, ,( ) ) vHu u   is in the 
core. The following proposition shows that under the restriction of the strictly 
price-based property, for a strategy profile compatible with the core, it is sufficient to 
examine the profiles of representative valuation functions. 
 
Proposition 12: Suppose that a combination of an indirect mechanism and a strategy 
profile  (,) H   is strictly price-based for a price-demand scheme  . Then,   is 
compatible with the core in  H  if and only if for every  () E U   , 
[] [] (, ,( ) )
EE vHu u   
is in the core for 
[] E u . 
 
Proof: The “only if” part is straightforward from the definition of efficiency in terms of 35 
 
strategy profile. We can prove the “if” part in the same manner as the proof of Theorem 
4. It is clear from Lemma 3 that for every  iN  , every  ( ) ii i aA E  , every  ii aA   , and 
every ( ) ii i uU E  , 
   
[] [] () () () ()
ii EE
iiiii ii i uauau au a    . 
Hence, for every  () aA E  , every  aA   , and every  NN   , if 













   
{0}






  for  all  () uU E  . 
This, along with 
[] (( ) ) ()
E hu A E    and 
[] (( ) ) (() )
E hu hu    for all  () uU E  , 
implies that for every  () E u   ,  (, ,( ) ) vHu u   is in the core for any  () uU E   
whenever 
[] [] (, ,( ) )
EE vHu u    is in the core for 




10. Core-Selecting Mechanisms 
 
 An  indirect  mechanism  H  is said to be core-selecting if it is a direct mechanism 
and  (, , ) vHuu  is in the core for every uU  . An example of a core-selecting 
mechanism is the first-price package auction addressed by Bernheim and Whinston 
(1986). There are many recent works in the combinatorial auction literature, such as 
Day and Raghavan (2007) and Day and Milgrom (2008) that investigated the general 
framework of core-selecting mechanism. It is clear from this literature that in any 
core-selecting mechanism, there exists a universal Nash equilibrium strategy profile that 
is compatible with the core. This strategy profile, however, is not necessarily 
price-based for a price-demand scheme. Hence, it is important to examine whether there 
exists a universal Nash equilibrium that is not only compatible with the core, but also 
price-based for the price-demand scheme. This section provides an affirmative answer. 
For any universal Nash equilibrium strategy profile   and any price-demand 
scheme   , let us specify an alternative strategy profile 
[]    by 
   
[] [] [] () ( )
E uu
    for  all  () E U    and  all  () uU E  . 
Note that this specified strategy profile 
[]    satisfies the price-based property for   . 
The following proposition shows a sufficient condition, under which, 
[]    is also a 
universal Nash equilibrium that is compatible with the core. This condition, which is 
given by property (19) below, implies that the induced allocation 
[] ()
E uA    is 
always revealed in any profile of price-demand sets  E . 
 
Proposition 13: Consider any price-demand scheme   , any core-selecting mechanism 
H , and any universal Nash equilibrium    that is compatible with the core. Suppose 
that 
(19)   
[] ()( )
E uA E    for  all  () E U   . 
Then, strategy profile 
[]    is also a universal Nash equilibrium that is strictly 
price-based for   , and it is compatible with the core. 
 
Proof: Property (19), along with the price-based property of 
[]   , implies that 37 
 
[] (, ) H
    is strictly price-based for   . Since for every  () E U   , 
[] ()
E u    is a Nash 
equilibrium in 
[] (, )
E Hu , and 
[] [] (, ,( ) )
EE vHu u    is in the core for 
[] E u , it follows from 
Propositions 10 and 12 that 
[]    is a universal Nash equilibrium that is compatible 








  We investigated the problem of combinatorial auction design, where multiple items 
with multiple units are sold to the buyers who have quasi-linear and private valuations. 
Because of privacy and complexity, the auctioneer can only use partial information, 
which is collected through a price-based auction format. The auctioneer collects it by 
asking a limited number of price vectors to which the buyers provide their demand 
responses. 
In a general setting with connectedness, we showed that for the existence of the 
price-based VCG mechanism, it is necessary and sufficient that the efficient allocation 
and the efficient allocations without any single buyer are all revealed in the observed 
price-demand sets. We demonstrated that for the existence of an efficient, strategy-proof, 
and price-based mechanism with participation constraints, it is necessary and sufficient 
that the efficient allocation is revealed. We showed a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the existence of strictly price-based mechanism that is approximately strategy-proof. 
We also investigated a general class of indirect mechanisms, and showed sufficient 
conditions for the consistency of the price-based property with universal Nash 
equilibrium, efficiency, and core. Finally, we investigated core-selecting mechanisms, 
and presented a sufficient condition for the existence of a universal Nash equilibrium 
that is compatible with the core. 
  For making it tractable to examine whether these conditions are satisfied, the 
concept of representation valuation function played the central role. Consistent with any 
observed price-demand set, the representative valuation function assigns the minimal 
relative valuation to any revealed package. Because of this relative minimization, it is 
sufficient to examine the representative valuation functions in every aspect of this paper. 
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